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BOOK REVIEWS
law, (2) the enactments of the Northwest Territory, and (3) the laws
of Indiana Territory, both those of the first-grade government and those
of the second-grade government. The laws were not printed until 1804.
The French could not understand English, and there was such opposition
to all tax laws that the scheme of social control set up was entirely inadequate. It was characterized more by disobedience and nullification than
by any real control.
The social life was characterized by gambling, lotteries, drunkenness,
the teaching of vices to Indians, frontier fighting, vagrancy, idleness, and
Sabbath breaking. Governor Harrison said that the territory had become
"an asylum for the vile and abandoned criminals." Laws against such
practices as have been named were promulgated in Puritan fashion, but
also in Puritan fashion they were not enforced. Mr. Philbrick gives one
instance of a legislative divorce. Imprisonment for debt was common.
Slavery of the blacks existed, in spite of the Northwest Ordinance (Mr.
Esarey to the contrary), through the option given to the blacks either of
indenture or going back to their slave state.
The judicial system was characterized by circuit riding. This was
unsatisfactory and burdensome. The admission requirements for attorneys
were low; yet the reason for this was not the scarcity of attorneys. Even
the judges were corrupt. Yet, if there was any learned profession in
the territory, it was the legal profession. On the whole, the laws published in this volume and the introduction of Mr. Philbrick give a sorry
picture of the political and social life of the people of Indiana Territory.
It is too sordid and primitive to awaken anything but shame and disappointment. But perhaps many things which still exist in the state of
Indiana can be better understood in the light of the early history of the
period covered by this volume.
HUGH E. WILLIS
Indiana University School of Law.
LAWS OF INDIANA TERRITORY, 1801-1809. By Francis S. Philbrick.
Indianapolis, Indiana. Historical Bureau of the Indiana Library and
Historical Department. 1930. Pp. CCLXXXII, 741. Price $3.00.
This volume is a reprint of the volume reviewed above and is like the
above volume in every respect, except for a supplement to the appendix,
printed after the index, containing a list of officials, and except for four
additional maps. The Indiana reprint is issued on thin paper so that the
volume is only half the size of the original publication. One hundred
copies have been printed on rag paper for the sake of permanence for
preservation in the larger libraries of the state.
PROGRESS OF THE LAW IN THE U. S. SUPREME COURT, 1930-31.
By Gregory Hankin and Charlotte A. Hankin. Washington: Legal
Research Service; New York: The MacMillan Company. 1931. Pp. xv,
525. Price $5.00.
This is the third annual review by Mr. and Mrs. Hankin of the work
of the Supreme Court of the United States. These annual reviews ought
to be of great assistance to the law teaching profession, to practicing
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lawyers, and even to the judges themselves. The work of the authors
shows continuing improvement. However, they still continue to discuss
cases before the Supreme Court prior to their decision by the Supreme
Court. The authors meet this criticism, made by the reviewer last year,
by the explanation that such practice lends contifiuity to the discussion
within the volume and connects the treatment of one year with that of
another. Probably the case of the Chicago Rapid Transit Company (p. 127)
would be given as an illustration of these points. But the reviewer is
not able to see how a statement given by the authors that, "This case has
not yet been argued, but the court has already passed favorably on the
question of jurisdiction," lends continuity to a discussion within the
volume, or profitably connects the treatment of one year with that of
another. The authors, year by year, show more independence of view
and greater grasp of constitutional questions, yet they show a proper
reserve about introducing their own views, except where it is necessary
to clarify the work of the court.
The authors suggest that where petitions for certiorari are denied
by the court, reasons for such denial should be given (p. 53), both for
the information of attorneys, and to diminish the number of cases later
to come before the court. They also suggest the adoption by the Supreme
Court of a policy of more frequent reversals (p. xi) of its own decisions.
They should be commended for both of these suggestions, provided, in the
case of the first, that the statement of reasons is so short as not to slow
up the work of the court.
This volume also contains an illuminating table classifying the types
of cases before the Supreme Court in the 1930 term (p. 58). This shows
that of all the types of cases before the Supreme Court, those on taxation
are by far the most numerous (278). The second most numerous type of
case is that concerning public utilities (92). Next come labor problems
(73), then criminal cases not including prohibition (66), then property
cases (48), then prohibition cases (44), then insurance cases (43), and
then a miscellaneous list of other cases, making a grand total of 1,015.
Two other interesting things included in this volume are a discussion
of the question of whether or not Chief Justice Hughes is a liberal or a
conservative, and a table showing the number of opinions written by the
different members of the court in 1930. The authors find that Chief
Justice Hughes ranks now, as he always has, as a liberal, except, perhaps,
in the field of taxation. Chief Justice Hughes has the credit also for
writing the greatest number of opinions, twenty-nine. Justice VanDevanter has the record for writing the smallest number of opinions, only
five. Justice McReynolds has the largest number of dissenting opinions;
while Justices Holmes and Brandeis have no dissenting opinions, a great
change from the situation in prior terms.
HUGH E. WILLIs
Indiana University School of Law.

